Abstract
Introduction
paper, scientific uncertainty is our main interest.
2 Therefore, we consistently use threshold 48 uncertainty referring to the type of scientific uncertainty and we manipulate its degree in a
49
1 There are many other examples in a real world. These include a possible disintegration of the Antarctic Ice Sheet, irreversible global warming and eutrophication for lakes (See, e.g., Naevdal (2006) , Ulph and Ulph (1997) and Carpenter et al. (1999) ). A common feature of these environmental and natural resource problems is the existence of threshold, though its location is not known to human beings.
2 Here we use the term "uncertainty" to refer to the events with probability distribution, which should be distingusihed from "ambiguity" where even probability cannot be assigned for each event.
series of economic experiments, keeping social uncertainty constant.
or the variance of threshold distributions. This is motivated by the fact that resource and environmental problems come with threshold uncertainty and its degree depends on scientific 74 uncertainty (See, e.g., Naevdal and Oppenheimer (2007) ). However, there has been no sys-75 tematic analyses to this question despite its importance in the real world. For instance, how 76 much to mitigate the degree of threshold uncertainty through scientific research is becom-77 ing highly controversial as in the discussion of global warming problems. This is supported 78 by a series of reports that the degree of scientific uncertainty on global warming highly af-79 fects people's actual cooperative attitude to this event (See, e.g., Oppenheimer (1998) 
Cookson (2009)).

81
A second open question is "how does the difference in the framing affect cooperative 82 behaviors in the presence of threshold uncertainty?" We are interested in this because a 83 collective decision such as environmental and resource problems can be either framed as 84 public bads prevention or public goods provision. These are referred to as a "negative" to the uncertainty as well as to the framing depending on the type of people?" Although 95 there are several researches which have identified some responses to the framing focusing on 96 each type of people (Park (2000) and Sonnemans et al. (1998) ), no works have analyzed the 97 heterogeneous response to both framing and uncertainty in a systematic way under PPM.
98
As mentioned earlier, Park (2000) and Sonnemans et al. (1998) previous works such as Suleiman et al. (2001) and McBride (2008) , our focus is on the effect 109 of the degree of threshold uncertainty on cooperation rather than the threshold mean levels.
110
Therefore, we systematically manipulate the threshold uncertainty, fixing threshold means 111 around some level in the experiments. By focusing only on the change in the degree of 112 threshold uncertainty, cooperation levels predicted by Nash equilibrium increase and then
113
decrease with the degree of threshold uncertainty, i.e., a single-peaked (or inverted U-shaped)
114
over the degree, and we seek to confirm whether experimental results qualitatively follow this 115 theoretical prediction. 5 Second, we examine an existence of framing effects in a PPM. For 116 these purposes, our experiment controls strategic effects and social uncertainty with random 117 rematching of group members. These features make distinction from the previous studies.
118
We obtain two novel results in this experimental research. First, aggregate framing effects 119 are negligible, though the response to the frame is opposite depending on the type of social 120 preference in each subject. "Cooperative" subjects cooperate less, whereas "indivisualistic" 121 subjects cooperate more in a public goods setting than in a public bads setting. This implies 122 4 Furthermore, Park (2000) points out that the results on the response to the framing in Sonnemans et al. (1998) would be confounding due to the use of partner design.
5 Suleiman et al. (2001) also manipulated the degree of threshold uncertainty, but they simply employ two different levels. Therefore, their finding can tell only whether cooperation increases or not with it. In contrast, our research uses a wider range of threshold uncertainty with four different levels, and we identify that the degree of cooperation predicted by Nash equilibrium becomes a single-peaked over the domain of threshold uncertainty. This is another unique feature of this study.
that insignificance of the aggregate framing effect arises from the behavioral asymmetry.
Second, the percentage of cooperative choices non-monotonically changes as the degree of 124 threshold uncertainty increases, irrespective of framing and the type of value orientation.
125
More specifically, we find that the degree of cooperation is the highest in the intermediate 126 level of threshold uncertainty, whereas it sharply drops as threshold uncertainty becomes 127 sufficiently large. By and large, we say that the changes of cooperative behaviors in response 128 to the degree of threshold uncertainty are qualitatively consistent with Nash predictions.
129
The results have several policy implications. Concerning the framing effects, employing 130 a PPM to induce more cooperation under a negative frame can be more effective than the 131 VCM. This is because our results show insignificance of aggregate framing effects in the 132 PPM. However, this result should be understood with caution. That is, the composition 133 of population with respect to social preferences can determine whether aggregate framing 134 effects are present due to asymmetric responses to the framing. The experimental results also 135 suggest that reducing threshold uncertainty can enhance cooperation, whereas the degree of 136 threshold uncertainty does not need to be reduced to nil. This would give rise to an optimal 137 strategy of scientific research on threshold uncertainty in a real world problem. That is, the 138 scientific research to reduce the uncertainty with respect to a location of threshold deserves 139 some effort. However, an attempt to pinpoint its location might not make sense if we consider 140 the cost of research as well as its negligible impact on cooperation.
141
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental designs 142 and procedures. In section 3, we present experimental results with some statistical analysis 143 on the hypotheses. Final section offers some discussion and concluding remarks. The economic experiment was carried out in the computerized experimental laboratory of 147 Yokohama National University, and comprises eight sessions each involving 40 subjects for a 148 total of 320 subjects and 10 decision-making periods for each session. They were volunteers 149 from undergraduate students in various fields except economics, participated in one session 150 only and made an average of $20 based on cumulative earnings. One session took about 151 one hour and it consists of two stages: In the first stage, a value orientation experiment 152 was conducted and a voluntary contribution experiment was followed in the second stage.
153
With a value orientation experiment, we categorize subjects into five types depending on 154 each subject's social goal: 1. Competitors-those who want to be better off than others; 2. 
159
In the second stage, eight treatments of a voluntary contribution game were implemented.
160
In a single session, one treatment is solely implemented so that a subject experienced only 161 one condition and we have independent samples. Each subject was randomly assigned to 162 a group of five people and rematched in every decision making round. In each round, each 163 subject was asked to make a choice between Yellow and Blue where she did not know the 164 identity of group members, but she knew that group members are shuffled in each round.
165
A series of these experimental designs associated with the formation of the group members 166 was employed to keep the strategic effects or social uncertainty as constant.
6 After each 167 6 We admit that this way is not perfect to keep social uncertainty constant, however it is one of the best possible ways to make our results comparable with other previous studies focusing on framing effects such as Andreoni (1995); Park (2000) . For this purpose, we were also careful about the composition of subject types in a session. Fortunately, our subject pools across sessions are homogeneous in the sense that 60 ∼ 70% is 'individualistic,' and the rest is 'cooperative' type of subjects. This guarantees that session-wise effects for social uncertainty are minimized that may derive from heterogeneous subject pools across different sessions round, subjects were informed about the resulting payoff. The earnings for each subject were calculated by applying some exchange rate to cumulative earnings accrued from 10 169 rounds at the end of a session. There are two important key factors characterizing the difference of treatments: 1. fram-179 ing and 2. the degree of threshold uncertainty. As for framing, we follow the procedure 180 adopted by Sonnemans et al. (1998) . Table 1 Incentive-wise equivalent to
Nash equilibriua (# of cooperative choices) 0 or 3 0 or 3 0 or 4 0 0 or 3 0 or 3 0 or 4 0 implements only one treatment out of {G0, G1, G2, G3, B0, B1, B2, B3}. In each session, 40 210 subjects were employed, and in total 320 subjects participated in our experiments.
211
For each treatment, we can make theoretical predictions based on Nash equilibrium 212 concept under risk neutral agents. For G0, B0, G1 and B1, there are two pure Nash equilibria: We show the effect of framing on cooperative choices. The results in treatments G0, G1, G2
228
and G3 are compared with those in treatments B0, B1, B2 and B3, respectively. Notes: A number of subjects corresponding to each value orientation and its total is given in parentheses.
are not so significant in pooling all subjects for each level of threshold uncertainty. Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests are conducted to examine whether there is a framing dif- We discuss how cooperative choice changes with the degree of threshold uncertainty. Next, we turn to the discussion of overall trends by looking at each type of value ori-342 entations in cooperative choices under both frames. Subfigure 6(b) reveals determinants of 343 the two trends in subfigure 6(a). As we have mentioned earlier, more than 90 percent of our 344 subject pool is dominated by "individualistic" and "cooperative" subjects based on value 345 orientation tests, and thus we focus only on these two types.
346
We confirm from subfigure 6(b) that each type of value orientation in both frames follows 347 the same pattern observed in figure 6(a) ; that is, as the degree of threshold uncertainty rises, 348 the percentage of cooperative choices increases up to the middle. However, once threshold 349 uncertainty reaches level 3, subjects become less cooperative.
Statistical observation of the uncertainty effects
351
We now compare the cooperative choices across different levels of threshold uncertainty over alistic" subjects, we could say that "individualistic" subjects cooperate less if the degree of 423 threshold level gets too large, and they cooperate more if it is in the intermediate level. Finally, we focus on "cooperative" subjects across different levels of threshold uncertainty. frames. This is the first systematic attempt that analyzes this issue by controlling strategic 447 effects and social uncertainty. The novelty of our experiment comes from the fact that the 448 degree of threshold uncertainty is widely varied in the way that the number of subjects in a 449 group on a Nash equilibrium strategy increases and then falls as the degree of uncertainty 450 gets increased.
451
We considered four different levels of threshold uncertainty in experimental design. Our 452 experiment reveals two main results. A first result is that aggregate framing effects are negligible in a PPM, irrespective of threshold uncertainty level. However, it is found that 454 each type of people in social preference is responding to the framing in a different direction.
455
"Cooperative" subjects become more cooperative in negative frames than in positive frames,
456
while "individualistic" subjects are less cooperative in negative frames than in positive ones.
457
Since a majority of subjects in our experiment consists of "cooperative" and "individualis- However, we have to note several differences between our study and Sonnemans et al.
462
(1998) with respect to the experimental setups. First, our experimental settings more closely while a partner design of keeping the same partners in a group is adopted in Sonnemans 467 et al. (1998) . In this sense, the result of this paper can be directly parallel to the important 468 works on framing effects in VCM.
469
Here, our key question is why "cooperative" subjects become more cooperative in bads 470 setting, while "individualistic" subjects show the opposite pattern. As we know, the goal 471 for "cooperative" subjects is to do best for a society, and they are the type of people who 472 wish a best outcome for a group in an experiment. Unlikely to the VCM, a PPM possesses 473 multiple Nash equilibria and one of them leads to a Pareto optimal outcome when the degree 474 of threshold uncertainty is not so large. It is our conjecture that, in this case, "cooperative" 475 subjects feel more obligation to cooperate when they face a negative framing situation rather 476 than positive ones. This may be due to their strong intrinsic motivations for a best outcome 477 in a group under negative frames. On the other hand, the results on "individualistic" subjects 478 in framing can be understood in the same way as the researchers claim in a VCM case.
479
The second result is that cooperation collapses when the degree of threshold uncertainty exceeds a certain level. Degree of uncertainty G0 vs. B0 G1 vs. B1 G2 vs. B2 G3 vs. B3 Mann-Whitney test z = 0.387 z = 0.380 z = 0.762 z = 1.520 Note: * Significant at 10% level, * * Significant at 5% level, * * * Significant at 1% level. Degree of uncertainty G0 G1 G2 G3 Mann-Whitney test z = −0.530 z = 2.524 * * z = 2.900 * * * z = −0.228 Note: * Significant at 10% level, * * Significant at 5% level, * * * Significant at 1% level. Degree of uncertainty B0 B1 B2 B3 Mann-Whitney test z = 3.194 * * * z = 3.556 * * * z = 0.991 z = 3.205 * * * Note: * Significant at 10% level, * * Significant at 5% level, * * * Significant at 1% level. Note: * Significant at 10% level, * * Significant at 5% level, * * * Significant at 1% level. (b) Bads settings Figure 9 : Cooperative choices of "cooperative" subjects for each degree of threshold uncertainty over 10 rounds Note: * Significant at 10% level, * * Significant at 5% level, * * * Significant at 1% level.
